For over a decade neuroscience has uncovered that appropriate decision-making in daily life decisions results from a strong interplay between cognition and covert biases produced by emotional processes. This interplay is particularly important in social contexts: lesions in the pathways supporting these processes provoke serious impairments on social behavior. One important mechanism in social contexts is empathy, fundamental for appropriate social behavior. This paper presents arguments supporting this connection between cognition and emotion, in individual as well as in social contexts. The central claim of this paper is that biologically inspired cognitive architectures ought to include these mechanisms. A taxonomy of computational models addressing emotions is presented, together with a brief survey of the research published in this area. The Prisoner Dilemma game is used as a case study exposing the trade-o® between individual rationality and cooperative behavior. Experiments using a simple implementation of empathy and emotion expression, employing an Iterated Prisoner Dilemma setup, illustrate the emergence of a cooperative behavior mutually bene¯cial for both players.
Introduction
This paper addresses the role of emotions in cognition, in particular in what concerns its function in social behavior. According to the theory of evolution, all species are essentially survivors. Their actions are ultimately driven by individual survivability. However, individuals of some species interact socially in such a way the outcome is mutually bene¯cial [Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971] . In many cases, this demands for letting go short-term individual bene¯ts, in exchange of long-term mutual ones, even if the individual bene¯t supplants the latter. One example of this behavior is food sharing. In some cases, mutual bene¯ts are a mere potential, or even nonexistent, as in the case of altruism. Such behavior contradicts, at least at ā rst glance, pure rationality. The term rationality is used along this paper in the classical, utilitarian, decision theoretic sense of maximization of the expected utility [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944] . A broader view of rationality, encompassing emotions in particular, can be found, for instance, in [de Sousa, 1987] . In this paper, we limit our analysis to social contexts where individuals do have a choice of whether to cooperate, thus excluding hard-wired social behaviors such as the ones found in ant colonies. The Prisoner Dilemma (PD) game is a paradigmatic case contrasting individual and cooperative behavior [Poundstone, 1993] . The classic description of this problem follows a :
\Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police have insu±cient evidence for a conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to o®er the same deal. If one testi¯es (defects from the other) for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent (cooperates with the other), the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a¯ve-year sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent. Each one is assured that the other would not know about the betrayal before the end of the investigation. How should the prisoners act ?"
From an individual's standpoint, the rational choice would be to defect, regardless of the other's decision: if the other remains silent, defection is more bene¯cial (going free, against¯ve years in prison), but if the other defects, defection is still more bene¯cial (¯ve years against 10). Mutual defection is in fact the single Nash equilibrium point of this game. But if both defect, each one receives less than in the case when both cooperate. Although from an individual's point of view the best choice would be to defect, the cooperative option of both being silent is more (mutually) bene¯cial.
Neuroscienti¯c evidence has uncovered that cooperative behavior depends critically on emotions [Adolphs, 2003; Dam asio, 2003] . Evidence from humans playing the PD game have shown that the choice of cooperating rather than defecting is motivated by feelings of empathy with one another [Rilling et al., 2002] . These feelings contribute to bias decision away from a pure rational choice, towards alternative, reciprocally altruistic options. It is now commonly accepted that emotions are a fundamental aspect of intelligent behavior, and in fact intelligence cannot be understood separately from emotions [Pessoa, 2008] .
Emotional phenomena is in fact very broad in terms of their manifestations. Hudlicka [Hudlicka, 2009] distinguishes four di®erent modalities: (1) behavioral/ expressive, which concern expression and are visible by other persons (e.g., facial expressions), (2) somatic/neurophysiological, involving changes in the body state a http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner dilemma, retrieved 30-Mar-2010. (e.g., heart rate), (3) cognitive/interpretative, concerning their implications in the cognitive processes in the brain, and (4) experiential/subjective, which relates to thē rst-person subjective experience of emotions. This paper will be primarily concerned with the cognitive/interpretative modality particularly in what concerns decisionmaking. However, it should be made clear that these four modalities do strongly interact.
This paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 provides a brief historical perspective of intelligence understood as pure rationality, Sec. 3 reviews evidence on the role of emotions in decision-making processes of an individual, followed by Sec. 4 discussing its role in social contexts. Section 5 presents a survey of computational models of (and/or inspired by) emotional processes, followed by an illustrative example in Sec. 6 of a simple computational model for empathy in the iterated version of the Prisoner Dilemma game. Section 7 wraps up the paper with some conclusions.
On Rationality and Intelligence
People usually say \don't get emotional over this matter" in a manner of warning that emotions threaten to get in the way of the sound analysis of a situation. In fact, Western culture has been dominated by a Cartesian view of intelligence as dispassionate reasoning, happening in the realm of a disembodied mind. And on the contrary, emotions are viewed as something pertaining to the body, hence outside of the realm of reason. Intelligence and emotions are thus two things living in di®erent, contradictory worlds.
The common sense idea of rationality opposing emotions can be traced back to the Greeks. For instance, Plato sustained an everlasting struggle between reason and emotion in our minds, with each one reaching for dominance over the other [Lyons, 1999] . This dualistic view lies behind the assumption that, if human level intelligence is sought, one should focus exclusively on rationality, factoring out the emotional. Intelligence has been understood as a synonym of reason.
During the¯rst decades after the emergence of Arti¯cial Intelligence (AI) as ā eld, this rational view of intelligence has been largely dominant. Despite many successes accomplished by the¯eld, general intelligence constitutes, still, largely an open issue [Nilsson, 2005] . We argue on the assumption that one important missing link in the understanding of general intelligence is the role of emotions. The factorization of mental activity into reason and emotions, which has been silently assumed in many approaches to AI, has been questioned by neuroscienti¯c evidence [Damasio, 1994; Pessoa, 2008] . The next section discusses some of these¯ndings.
On Emotions and Decision-making
Dam asio, among other researchers, have performed extensive studies on the role of emotion in decision-making, focusing on their neural correlates [Dam asio et al., 1991; Bechara et al., 1997] . Although the modulatory e®ects that emotional phenomena induces on mental activity have been thoroughly studied (e.g., attention focus, memory retrieval, etc.), he sustained that emotions are an integral part of decisionmaking processes. Moreover, he stresses that these mechanisms are founded on the body, and thus mind and body make an indivisible whole. This contrasts with the dualistic mind-body view of Descartes, thus motivating the name of his book \Descartes' Error" [Dam asio, 1994] . This view is founded on his Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH), according to which mental imagery is associated with internal representations of body states [Dam asio et al., 1991; Dam asio, 1994] . In certain situations (e.g., stressful), the brain associates mental imagery related with a situation with the alterations of the body state representations, induced by the emotional state. The associations thus formed can be re-enacted later, when the subject is experiencing a similar situation, or even when considering that situation as a possible consequence of a course of action. This re-enactment occurs using the same brain mechanisms as the ones prompting the body-state alterations following the emotion. This brain zone is the amygdala, serving as a central hub involving practically all emotion processes in the brain.
The implications of these processes in decision-making comes from a set of projections from the amygdala to the prefrontal cortex, where most high-level, cognitive processes are believed to occur (reasoning, planning, working memory, and so on). The function of these projections from the amygdala to the prefrontal cortex was studied by Dam asio. It is from studies of patients with lesions in these projections that most evidence supporting the SMH comes from. Patients with these lesions behaved otherwise normally, except when facing certain decisions. The cognitive capabilities, as evaluated by I.Q. tests, turned out to be within normal. Dam asio describes a particular case of such a patient that, when faced with the need to schedule his next meeting with him, the patient was unable to do so in useful time. He pondered endlessly the pros and cons of each possible option. Other reported consequences are the inability to make reasonable¯nancial investment decisions, and di±culties in initiating a loving relationship. These patients usually lose their jobs, and marriages often dissolve. This suggests that the most practical, daily forms of decision-making depend critically on emotional mechanisms in the brain [Dam asio, 1994] .
These¯ndings support the hypothesis that it is in situations where future outcomes are more uncertain, in the sense of being hard to predict in detail, that emotion processes provide a crucial contribution for appropriate decision-making.
Aaron Sloman has contested the claim that emotions are a prerequisite for intelligent behavior, on the following grounds [Sloman 1998; : the lesions studied by Dam asio impair both (1) emotions and (2) decision-making, from which one cannot infer that the e®ect (1) implies e®ect (2). This does not contradict, however, the hypothesis that there are processes in the brain, which support emotions, that are essential for appropriate decision-making. Moreover, the e®ects of these processes in decision-making are known to take place even if no emotion is felt by the subject.
On Emotions and Social Cognition
One prime example of dynamically changing environments are social contexts. Here, the pairing between actions and reward expectancy may change dramatically with time. The Iterated Prisoner Dilemma (IPD) game is a paradigmatic example of such a situation. The IPD is an iterated version of the Prisoner Dilemma game (described in Sec. 1), where each player has access to the previous turns, and the payo®s are monetary, speci¯ed in Table 1 .
From an individual point of view, each player maximizes his payo® by defecting. For example (Table 1(b)), if they both defect, the payo® is $1 for each, while mutual cooperation yields $2 to both of them. However, when one cooperates and the other defects, the former gets $0, while the defector gains $3. The dynamics of this game comes from the fact that, if one of the agents switches strategy (e.g., from cooperation to defection), the opponent has to rapidly adjust his own strategy.
With the use of brain imaging techniques, subjects have been scanned while playing IPD games. It was found that brain regions implicated in the SMH mechanism bias decision-making towards cooperative behavior in this game [Rilling et al., 2002; Adolphs, 2003] . In particular, the mechanism of re-enactment of the body state representation seems to be crucial for subjects to cooperate. Failure to do so, as can be observed in patients with speci¯c brain lesions, lead subjects to defect, preferring immediate rewards, in exchange for the long-term bene¯ts of mutual cooperation. Interestingly, after the experiments, control subjects reported that mutual cooperation was the most personally satisfying outcome, while defection provoked feelings of guilt.
One of the serious consequences of the lesions studied by Dam asio concerned social behavior. From his studies of patients with lesions a®ecting emotional mechanisms, he reported that they lose the ability to make appropriate decisions under uncertainty. For instance, they showed severe impairment in empathy, as well as maintaining personal trust, adequate social behavior, maintaining marriage and a healthy relationship with the o®spring. But strikingly, intellectual capabilities remained intact, as they were (verbally) aware of the social rules they themselves break [Dam asio, 2003 ]. Table 1 . Payo®s for the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma game: (a) canonical payo®s table, where T > R > P > S and 2R > T þ S [Nowak and Sigmund, 1990] ; (b) example payo®s. Actions: C ¼ cooperate; D ¼ defect. Payo®s in the form P 1 =P 2 where P 1 and P 2 are the payo®s for players 1 and 2. 
Empathy is an important mechanism for social interaction. Brain imaging studies have revealed that empathy is based on changing one's internal body representation, by the replication of the feelings of others. One study has shown that this representation is more intense when imitating a facial expression than when observing one [Carr et al., 2003] . Another study provided evidence that we understand the pain of others by instantiating it internally in our brain [Jackson et al., 2005] . The importance of this internal re-enactment of feelings of others is corroborated by evidence revealing that lesions in the amygdala compromise more the perception of social emotions from faces, than simple emotions [Baron-Cohen and Tranel, 2002] . This re-enactment of internal body states after the observation of the same states in others resonates nicely with the discovery of the mirror neurons [Carr et al., 2003] : these neurons are both active while performing a goal-directed action, and while watching someone else performing the same action [Gallese et al., 1996] .
In summary, neuroscienti¯c evidence has supported the hypothesis that appropriate social behavior depends critically on emotional mechanisms in the brain [Rilling et al., 2008] . One reason for this may be the uncertain nature of the decisions involved in social contexts. When uncertainty (or unpredictability) in future outcomes is present, it is hard to draw conclusions of the bene¯ts of these outcomes, based on rational principles alone. Thus, emotions emerge as an alternative mechanism for making decisions. Thus, it is under uncertainty that emotional mechanisms are more relevant for decision-making.
On Computational Models of Emotions
The main goal of this section is to provide a taxonomy of computational models addressing emotions, together with a brief survey of recent research. A broad variety of research is covered, ranging from interactive systems to emotion-based cognitive architectures.
Early approaches
The idea of using emotion mechanisms in arti¯cial systems was¯rst proposed by Herbert Simon in 1967 [Simon, 1967] . In his paper, Simon considers systems with multiple goals. When faced with real-time systems, where the survival of the system depends on its response time in certain situations, an interrupt system capable of interrupting current processing in order to attend to a real-time solicitation is considered by Simon as an emotional behavior mechanism. A few decades afterwards, Aaron Sloman and Monica Croucher sketched a complex architecture of the mind, in which emotions play an important role. In a similar fashion as Simon, emotions are taken to play the role of interrupting current processing in order to cope with the vicissitudes of a changing and partly unpredictable environment. Sloman and Croucher conjecture in their paper from 1981 that \interruptions, disturbances and departures from rationality which characterize emotions are a natural consequence of the sorts of mechanisms required by the constraints on the design of intelligent systems" [Sloman and Croucher, 1981] .
Both Simon and Sloman approached emotions as mechanisms of a larger system. They claimed that a cognitive system complex enough to exhibit intelligent behavior at a level similar to the human one ought to incorporate emotion-like mechanisms. Note that the focus is not on speci¯c human emotions, but rather on the mechanisms involved in emotion processing.
An alternative approach is possible, though: the design of a system endowed with representations and mechanisms closely based on human emotions. Early works on this line of research include the ones of Jaap Swagerman, based on the emotion theories of Nico Frijda [1986] . In [Dyer, 1987] Michael Dyer reviews previous computer models that exhibit comprehension and/or generation of emotional behavior.
Taxonomy
In the taxonomy proposed here, computational approaches to emotions are¯rst divided in two main areas, designated here as focused on internal and external manifestations of emotions. This division concerns whether the design of the artifact is more focused on the internal implications of emotions on cognitive processes, or on the interactive/communicative aspects of emotions.
Alternative taxonomies of computational models can be found in the literature. For instance, Hudlicka has proposed a categorization of the approaches among emotion generation, addressing how emotions arise in a given situation, and emotion e®ects. In this latter category, Hudlicka distinguishes between visible, behavioral e®ects, and the less visible in°uence on attention, perception, and cognition [Hudlicka, 2008] . These two subcategories can be mapped onto the division of the approaches among internal and external manifestations proposed in this paper.
The division proposed here, among internal and external manifestations of emotions, corresponds roughly to the modalities (1) behavioral/expressive and (2) cognitive/interpretative referred in Sec. 1. These two approaches are not hermetic, as they are both inspired in the same integrated phenomena of biological emotions.
Within each of these two areas, the proposed taxonomy further divides research in a set of subareas. The criterion guiding the choice of subareas is based on the research goal stated by the authors. For instance, the architectures subarea concerns the construction of architectures, while robotics includes the implementation in a real (or simulated) robot. The adopted taxonomy, organized in two levels of details, follows. A more in-depth review of the cited literature can be found in the thesis [Ventura, 2008] . Here we will limit ourselves to a survey of the prominent approaches.
Internal manifestations of emotions
Architectures. Research in this area aims at a generic agent architecture where the internal mechanisms of emotions play a prominent role. Examples of this area include: Sloman's CogA®ect architecture [Sloman, 1998 ], based on viewing emotions as an alarm system; Toda's Emotional Fungus-eater [Toda, 1982] , where emotions are viewed as urges (motivational subroutines), which were further developed by Aub e [Aub e, 1998], adding the concept of emotions as commitment operators involving two or more agents; Pfeifer's FEELER model [Pfeifer, 1994] driven by a set of production rules, based on an emotions taxonomy proposed by the psychologist Bernard Weiner in 1982; Botelho's Salt & Pepper architecture [Botelho et al., 2004] where emotion signals and responses are generated by an a®ective appraisal process based on a production system; Burt's agent architecture, where emotions function as a scheme for managing resources in a three-layered architecture; Velasquez's Cathexis architecture [Vel asquez, 1998 ], founded on Minsky's Society of Mind [Minsky, 1988] ; and Staller's TABASCO architecture [Staller and Petta, 1998 ], a three-layered architecture (conceptual, schematic, and sensory) employing an appraisal approach.
Robotics. The goal in this area is the construction of mobile robots whose behavior is determined by emotional components in the architectures. Although the robotics area can be seen as an application of research on the architectures above, we included here the research work in which both one or more robots are involved (either physical or in simulation), together with its kinematic constraints, and when the proposed approach is somehow dedicated to robots. Examples include: Beaudoin's NML1 [Beaudoin, 1994 ] and Wright's MINDER1 [Wright, 1997] agent implementations, based on Sloman's architecture; Cañamero's agents [Cañamero, 1997] living in a grid-world, based on Minsky's Society of Mind paradigm [Minsky, 1988 ]; Scheutz's architecture [Scheutz, 2001] where several agents evolve in a 2D environment, driven by a schema-based controller [Arkin, 1989 ]; Gadanho's architecture [Gadanho and Hallam, 2002] targeting Khepera robots, combining reinforcement learning with an emotional system; Gmytrasiewicz's theoretic approach to emotions [Doshi and Gmytrasiewicz, 2004] ; and Morgado's signal processing approach [Morgado and Gaspar, 2005] , modeling the dynamics of variables, such as achievement potential, and achievement conductance.
Emotions modeling. This area aims at the creation of models of mechanisms of emotions, not necessarily biologically-inspired. Examples include: Arzi-Gonczarowski's formal modeling [Arzi-Gonczarowski, 2000] based on mathematical category theory; Gratch's approach [Gratch, 2000] based on cognitive appraisal theories, modeling the in°uence of emotions on the planning process of an autonomous agent; and Wilson's Arti¯cial Emotion Engine model [Wilson, 2000] employing Eysenck's model of personality traits.
Cognitive modeling. The research surveyed here addresses computational models of emotional mechanisms of the brain. The Emotion Modeling subarea is here distinguished from Cognitive Modeling one by the object being modeled: the latter aims at modeling cognitive mechanisms in humans, by the means of computational models, while the former is here understood in the context of (abstract) arti¯cial models of emotions. Examples include: Balkenius's computational model of emotional learning and processing [Balkenius and Mor en, 2001] , where several brain areas are explicitly modeled at a functional level, rather than at a neural level; D€ orner model of human action regulation (Psi-model) [D€ orner and Starker, 2004] , integrating cognition, motivation, and emotion; Fellous' model [Fellous, 2004] viewing emotions as dynamic patterns of neuromodulation, rather than patterns of neural activity as it is traditionally done; Hudlicka's computational cognitivea®ective architecture (MAMID) [Hudlicka, 2004] where the underlying idea is that a®ective states, together with personality traits (individual di®erences), manipulate a series of architectural parameters, such as the processing speed and capacity of a set of cognitive modules; Lisetti's neural network, modeling the human Autonomous Nervous System (ANS), capturing emotion processing at the physiological level [Lisetti, 1998 ]; Almeida's physiological model of the body [de Almeida et al., 2004] , at the organ level.
External manifestations of emotions
Believable agents. The goal in this area is to build interactive agents seeking suspension of disbelief with the user. Examples include: the Oz project at CMU addressing the construction of several interactive believable agents [Bates et al., 1994; Reilly, 1996 ]; Blumberg's AlphaWolves project, consisting of a social environment of a pack of virtual gray wolves [Tomlinson et al., 2002 ]; Elliott's A®ective Reasoner (AR) based on OCC theory, with the goal of simulating several aspects of emotion processing in a multi-agent setup [Elliott, 1992 ]; Numaoka's system targeted for the design of a personal assistant in a virtual reality setup [Numaoka, 1998 ]; Martinho's virtual reality installation for the Expo'98 World Fair, consisting of a pair of virtual dolphins interacting with the audience [Martinho et al., 2000] ; and Aylett's virtual Teletubbies (based on the well-known homonymous TV series for children), targeting collective behaviors of virtual sheep [Aylett, 1999] .
A®ective Human-Computer Interfaces (HCI). Traditional HCI is based on interaction with the user on a rational basis, while a®ective HCI focuses on a®ective interaction among users and computers. This includes two aspects: computers recognizing a®ective states of users, and computers expressing emotional states in a believable way. A®ective Computing, a term coined by Picard in 1995 [Picard, 1995] , proposes a shift on the way humans interact with machines, from a traditional, rational and deterministic basis, towards an interaction conveying a®ective content. The expression a®ective computing has since then gained a broader application, being often used to denote any computational model of emotions. Thus, for the sake of clarity, we have decided to categorize the following approaches as A®ective HCI. To attain believability of the expressed emotions, some form of emotion modeling is required, using for instance one of the approaches referred in previous paragraphs. Examples of a®ective HCI include Picard's research on techniques for measuring emotions [Vyzas and Picard 1998; , together with innovative applications [Healey et al., 1998; Picard and Scheirer, 2001 ]; Cynthia's Kismet [Breazeal, 2002] robot head, capable of being sensitive and expressing a broad range of emotions; Moshkina's AuRA robot architecture [Arkin and Balch, 1997] , modeling personality traits, attitudes, moods, and emotions; and Conati's probabilistic model of a user while interacting with educational games [Conati and Zhou, 2004] .
Emotion-based agents
Ventura et al. proposed in 1998 an emotion-based agent architecture ] inspired in Dam asio's Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) [Dam asio et al., 1991; Dam asio, 1994] . This architecture is founded on the principle that stimuli is processed internally by two layers with di®erent degrees of complexity and accuracy. These layers correspond to a (1) perceptual layer, providing a reactive, quick response to stimuli, and thus giving a primordial meaning to stimuli eliciting a response, and a (2) cognitive layer, representing stimuli with complex, high-dimensionality representations. This architecture was further developed and formalized in [Ventura and Pinto-Ferreira, 2007; .
Of particular relevance for social contexts, is the work of Maçãs et al., augmenting the model with an extra layer: a symbolic layer [Maçãs and Cust odio, 2003 ]. This extension was implemented in a market environment, where products are exchanged for money among agents. The agents seek survival, as well as the maximization of pro¯t from selling goods. There is explicit communication among agents, in which the symbolic layer plays a central role. In this framework, the cognitive and the symbolic layers distinguish themselves in the fact that, while the former is focused on individual behavior, the latter accounts for social issues. Social interaction enables an agent not only to take into account its own experience, but also the experience of others. This is done in a similar fashion than empathy: \When a sequence ends because of another agent change of expression, it is evaluated as if it was the own agent. This is the process of gathering and storing others' experiences." [Maçãs and Cust odio, 2003 ].
Illustrative Example
As an illustration that reciprocally altruistic behavior can result from empathy, a simple example was devised using the IPD domain. The motivation for using the IPD game was that it presents a trade-o® between individualistic and cooperative behavior, in such a way that cooperative behavior is more mutually bene¯cial, than the individually rational choice (Sec. 1).
Consider two agents playing the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma game, each one with its own strategy. In each turn, both agents are asked to perform one of two possible actions: to cooperate (C), or to defect (D). The payo®s each agent receives at each turn are speci¯ed in Table 1 (b). The turns are iterated a speci¯ed amount of times, and the performance of each player is assessed by the sum of the obtained payo®s.
Rational agent
The strategy of the rational agent is based on the maximization of the expected utility principle. The agent estimates the expected utility of each option (C or D), and chooses the one maximizing the expected utility of the outcome. The expected utility is computed with a moving average of the past rewards with a¯xed window. This is performed independently for each one of the actions.
Formally, we denote the history of the actions up to (discrete) time t by the vector A t , de¯ned by
and the corresponding rewards b by the vector R t , de¯ned by
where aðtÞ 2 fD; Cg and rðtÞ 2 R are the agent action and the resulting reward after turn t. Splitting these sequences with respect to the action performed by the agent we can write the ordered sequence of indices for which each action a 2 fD; Cg as
where t a i < t a iþ1 for all i. The moving average to estimate the expected utility of action a can then be expressed by
where L is the window size. The rational strategy boils down to the maximization of this expected utility over the possible actions
Emotion-empathic agent
The design of the emotion-empathic agent follows two simple principles, inspired by the¯ndings reviewed in Sec. 4: (i) each agent (faithfully) expresses an emotional response corresponding to the di®erence between the received reward and the expected utility for the performed action, and (ii) the agent decision takes into account not only the expected utility, but also the expected emotional response of the opponent (empathy). The¯rst principle follows from the evidence that emotion expression is fundamentally innate and faithful. c Empathy, in the sense of feeling what the other is feeling, is realized by the second principle: an agent's actions are not only determined by its individual payo®, but also by the expected empathic feeling.
b The terms payo® and reward will be used interchangeably throughout the rest of the paper. c Exceptions exist, such as in expression containment and in dramatic play, but demand e®ort (and training) of some sort by the subject. This is accomplished by considering a weighed sum of the expected reward with the expected emotion expressed by the opponent. For the sake of simplicity, emotion is here modeled as a scalar value of valence (positive is good, negative is bad, zero is neutral). Under the assumption that agents have a preference for positive states, we can map this valence to a utility value. This is assumedly an over-simpli¯cation of a®ective phenomena, but for the purposes of this illustration it is su±cient. This agent is implemented as an extension to the rational agent above, with the following modi¯cations. First, the capability of expressing the emotional response. Let us denote the emotion expressed by one agent after performing action a in turn t by emðtÞ ¼ rðtÞ À EU a ðt À 1Þ:
Following principle (i), the expressed emotion is the di®erence between the received payo® and the expected utility of the performed action a. All of the formalism introduced so far concerns one of the agents involved in the game. We will denote the variables for the other agent with a line over the variable, e.g., em ðtÞ is the emotion expressed by the other agent at t. An emotion-empathic agent computes the expected emotional response of the other agent by performing a moving average over its emotional responses
em ðt a n a Àk Þ;
where M is the window size. The emotion-empathic agent decision can then be formalized as follows, implementing the principle (ii) above:
The agent decision aims at the maximization of the expected utility, biased by the expected emotional response of the opponent. In other words, the empathy with the opponent's emotional expression (in expectation) exerts a bias on the rational decision. From expression (8) one realizes that there is a trade-o® between the complete sel¯shness of a rational agent (with ¼ 0), where (8) degenerates into (5), and acting altruistically (for ) 0).
Alternative approaches to IPD playing employing a®ective models can be found in the literature. In [Kim and Taber, 2004] , for instance, a model using the ACT-R cognitive architecture [Anderson et al., 2004] is used to experiment with the IPD game, modeling both a®ective and cognitive mechanisms.
Experimental results and discussion
The experimental setup we used to evaluate the performance of the proposed emotion-empathic agent consisted in running several IPD games and collecting statistics of the payo®s received by each agent. The agent strategies considered were the following:
emp -the emotion-empathic agent, which expresses an emotional state de¯ned in Eq. (6) and decides its action according to Eq. (8); rat -the rational agent, employing strategy Eq. (5), with zero emotional expression; rat+ -like rat but expressing an emotion response according to Eq. (6); t4t -the classic tit-for-tat strategy: action is the opponent's last move, while cooperating in the¯rst turn; t42t -the tit-for-two-tats strategy: action is cooperate unless the opponent's two last actions were to defect; t4t+ and t42t -like t4t and t42t but expressing emotional responses according to (6); rnd -a random agent, which actions are randomly drawn with equal probability.
For the emp, rat and rat+ agents, a simple exploration strategy was employed to allow for a better estimation of the expected utility and emotion expression. This exploration strategy consists on performing an equally probable random action with (decaying) probability pðtÞ ¼ tÀ1 (for t ¼ 1; 2; . . .) with 0 < < 1.
The results were collected after 100 games of 1000 steps each. The parameters used were ¼ 0:5; M ¼ L ¼ 10, and ¼ 0:9. For each game, the average payo® (accumulated payo® divided by the game length) was recorded. The results are presented as the average payo® over all games, for each combination of agents (Table 2) .
From these results we highlight the following observations, all statistically signi¯cant with p < 0:01:
(1) Two emotion-empathic agents perform better than two rational agents; the average payo® is however lower than full cooperation (average payo® of 2), and in fact, each agent only converges to a cooperative strategy in about 75% of the games. This can be explained by the initial exploratory phase, since during this ). This follows directly from the bias of the emotionempathic agent towards cooperation, since defection of one agent causes lower values of emotion response by the opponent. (3) Both the emotion-empathic and the rational agents outperform both the tit-fortat and tit-for-two-tats when playing against the random agent. This is caused by the maximization of the expected utility principle, which leads these agents to converge to a defective strategy against an agent that randomly cooperates/ defects (i.e., there is no practical advantage in cooperating). (4) Any combination of the tit-for-tat and of the tit-for-two-tats agents, including emotion expressive variants, yields full cooperation all the time (payo® of 2), simply because in this strategies no agent has ever the initiative to defect.
The parameter is responsible for the trade-o® between sel¯shness and altruism. What is the e®ect of this parameter in the results? Figure 1 plots the average payo®, in the same experimental conditions as before, in function of . This plot compares the average payo® (as de¯ned above) for two con¯gurations -two emotionempathic agents (emp/emp), and one emotion-empathic agent against a rational one with emotion expression (emp/rat+) -with varying from 0 to 1.4. As increases, the average payo® of the two emotion-empathic agents also increase, converging to cooperative strategies for > 0:5. We can then conclude that in this context, altruism promotes cooperation. There is, however, a price to pay: when playing against a rational agent, it takes advantage of the opponent's altruism and converges to defection. The emotion-empathic agent does not bother cooperating, since the positive emotion expressed by the rational agent overrules its own disadvantageous rewards. There is however a range of values of , between about 0.2 and 0.5, for which the emotion-empathic strategy converges to a defection strategy when playing against a rational agent, and to a (frequent) cooperative strategy when playing against an emotion-empathic agent.
It is important to note that strategies based on the tit-for-tat and on the tit-fortwo-tats are speci¯cally designed for the IPD domain, in the sense that they rely on the structure of the payo® table (Fig. 1) . Instead, the strategies emp, rat and rat+ learn from scratch the relation between the payo®s and actions. It would be possible, in principle, to design payo® tables such that the latter strategies would perform equally well, while the former ones would fail.
Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of emotion processes to intelligent behavior, from the design of arti¯cial systems standpoint. There is empirical evidence that emotions are capable of biasing decisions away from the rational choice, but it turns out that this bias can be mutually bene¯cial from a social point of view (often in a di®erent time scale).
Recent evidence sustaining the importance of emotional mechanisms in human decision-making was reviewed. The role of these mechanisms was discussed¯rst at the individual level, and then in social contexts. In fact, emotions were found to be particularly important for appropriate social behavior.
A survey of computational models addressing emotions was performed, framed by a proposal taxonomy of the¯eld. Both external and internal manifestations of emotions were covered, showing a wide range of research in these area for the past decades.
An illustrative implementation exploring the e®ects of emotional expression and empathy in the domain of the Iterated Prisoner Dilemma was presented, together with experimental results contrasting several strategies. These strategies included the rational choice, based on a plain maximization of expected utility, and the e®ect of biasing the rational choice taking into account the expected emotional response of the opponent. Results have shown that this bias contributes for a course of action more advantageous to both, than taking the rational choice.
From the perspective of the design of intelligent machines, we claim that inspiration from biology is a rich paradigm for advancing the¯eld. In this line, research on biologically-inspired cognitive architectures should take into account that emotions are integrated in the very process of human intelligence.
